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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Torts
AGGRAVATION OF A PRE-EXISTING CONDITION: INCLUDING THE ALLERGY FACTOR
Introduction
The "general rule" seems to be the goal of the ordinary legal querist, whether law
student or attorney, and once having determined that the specific factual circumstance
is included within a favorable "general rule," the analyst is inclined to congratulate
himself on a job well done. In reality the task often is merely begun; the "general
rule" may be the lid to a Pandora's box of formal and substantial difficulties. The ad-
vantage achieved by the strength of a favorable general rule may be negated by the
carelessness it tends to breed.
The text of this Note describes the various implications of such general rules in
regard to injuries involving the aggravation of a pre-existing condition or, more ex-
plicitly, when the condition of the person harmed is one of the ingredients of the
subsequent injury. The breadth of the topic presents a troublesome problem of limita-
tion and organization. Consequently, the scope of the Note encompasses only negligent
and intentional harms, and the subject matter is arranged according to the manner in
which the injury was inflicted. The first section treats the usual "aggravation" case,
where the injury results immediately from the tortious act of the wrongdoer. The
second section examines the liability for injuries resulting from the negligent treatment
of the original injury by a physician. The third section discusses the possibility of re-
covery for an injury resulting from an allergy of the victim himself. Within each of
these areas there is a "pre-existing condition" rule which, from all outward appearances,
renders the issue settled. However, a review of the case law indicates numerous difficul-
ties which may appear unexpectedly in the ordinary case involving such conditions.
I. THE "USUAL" AGGRAVATION CASE
A. In General
-The usual case in this area consists of the wrongful act of a tort-feasor causing
another's injury which results in the aggravation of a weakened condition existing within
the other.1 Since these conditions for the most part are unforeseeable and often unknown
even to the injured party, a theory has been proposed which would limit the tort-
feasor's liability to those consequences which are foreseeable, because the test of negli-
gence is usually based on foreseeability.2 Despite the logical consistency of this theory,
it has not been followed. As a general proposition, it is stated that the tort-feasor must
take his victim as he finds him, and his liability is not to be measured by the physical
strength of the party injured or his capacity to endure suffering. One of weak
physical structure has as much right to protection from bodily harm as a robust athlete.
Consequently, regardless of one's peculiar physical composition, the injury actually
caused by the wrongful act is the natural consequence of the wrong.3
1 Space does not permit a discussion of the issue of negligence in this situation; the scope of
this section includes only the issue of liability when the tort-feasor's act or omission is proved
wrongful. For an interesting discussion of the different tests to be applied in determining the issue
of negligence, cf. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.2 (1956); PROSSa, TORTS § 48 (2d ed. 1955); 1
COOLEY, TORTS 139-41 (4th ed. 1932).
2 A Colorado court in Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo. 344, 34 Am. Rep. 89, 92
(1878), favored this theory. However, subsequent cases in this jurisdiction have ignored its import
although the case has never been expressly overruled. City of Denver v. Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Pac.
403, 406 (1900). See also Roark v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 163 Mo. App. 705, 147 S.W. 499 (1912). The
weakness of the theory in general, and especially in the "aggravation" situation, is that its premises
are founded on the nebulous term "foreseeable" which allows for either a strict construction to ex-
clude most injuries or a loose construction to include all. Cf. 2 HARPER & JAMEs, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 1135; PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 259.
3 Trascher v. Eagle Indem. Co., 48 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 1950); Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 298
N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948); Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891); Lapleine v.
Morgan's L. & T.R. & S.S. Co., 40 La. Ann. 661, 4 So. 875 (1888). See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note
1, at 260.
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Another less frequent circumstance which brings the "aggravation" rule into play
is the "subsequent injury" case. If the victim suffers a subsequent injury not of his own
fault, which aggravates injuries received in the primary accident so that recovery is
retarded, the original wrongdoer is liable for the entire damage if the second injury is
a natural result of the first.4 The issue of proximate cause becomes significant in these
cases since the interval between injuries and the circumstances surrounding the second
injury may usher in the defense of intervening cause. Where there is no evidence con-
necting the cause of the second injury with the first,5 or where the second cause is distinct
and independent of the first,6 the courts have had little trouble sustaining the defense.
However, in many situations the question is close and some courts have permitted the
defense when a "voluntary" act of the injured party was involved in the second accident
such as stepping,7 walking with crutches,8 standing,9 or, at the extreme, committing
suicide.' 0 The rationale of most of these cases seems unwise since the plaintiff is being
penalized for "voluntarily" doing that which he must eventually do of necessity, e.g.,
ambulate. Later cases have not followed this reasoning in similar situations, although
this may be due to a more profitable use of the expert witness.'1
One condition worthy of special mention is a pre-existing nervous or mental
condition which is reactivated by the tort-feasor's wrongful act. Where this injury is
incident to the plaintiff's physical injuries, recovery is permitted.' 2 However, where
the injury is mental anguish, e.g., fright, followed by some sort of bodily injury, the
courts have taken divergent views. Where the conduct of the tort-feasor is intentional
or outrageous, recovery may be had.' 3 If his conduct is merely negligent some courts
require impact for recovery, 14 although this prerequisite is circumvented in many
jurisdictions by a liberal construction of the term.' 5 Although this "impact" theory was
formerly the rule in most courts, it has lost considerable ground in recent years and
has recently been branded the "minority rule."' 6 However, if the injury suffered is
4 Underwood v. Smith, 261 Ala. 181, 73 So. 2d 717 (1954); Nikisher v. Benninger, 377 Pa.
564, 105 A.2d 281 (1954); Rasa v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct.), modified on
other grounds, 277 App, Div. 780, 97 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1950).
5 Zogg v. O'Bryan, 237 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. App. 1951).
6 Rainwater v. Timothy, 87 So. 2d 11 (La. App. 1956).
7 Sporna v. Kalina, 184 Minn. 89, 237 N.W. 841 (1931); Raymond v. City of Haverhill, 169
Mass. 382, 47 N.E. 101 (1897). Contra, Bowyer v. Te-Co., Inc., 310 S.W.2d 892, 900 (Mo. 1958);
Underwood v. Smith, 261 Ala. 181, 73 So. 2d 717 (1954).
8 Vander Velde v. Village of Leroy, 140 Mich. 359, 103 N.W. 812 (1905). Contra, Welker v.
State, 284 App. Div. 996, 135 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1954); Hartnett v. Tripp, 231 Mass. 382, 121 N.E. 17
(1918).
9 Snow v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 185 Mass. 321, 70 N.E. 205 (1904). Contra, Enslein v.
Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 8 Misc. 2d 87, 165 N.Y.S.2d 630 *(Sup. Ct. 1957). Plaintiffs in both Of
these cases alleged the fall was due to dizziness caused by the original injury.
1o Daniels v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424 (1903).
11 See cases cited "Contra" in notes 7-9 supra.
12 Erie R.R. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920) (damages for shame and humiliation resulting from
disfigurement permitted). These are often termed "parasitic" damages.
13 Gullory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474, 478 (1955) (continually calling
the plaintiff a "dirty Mexican" and a "nigger lover"). Cf. PRossm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 38. For
a complete list of cases regarding liability for insulting or abusive language, see Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d
108 (1951).
14 Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
15 Cf. Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (smoke). See also McNiece,
Psychic Injury. and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1, 51-58 (1949).
16 See Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955); Belt v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 195 F.2d 241, 243 (10th Cir. 1952); Nelson v. Black, 266 P.2d 817 (Cal. App.),
aff'd, 43 Cal. 2d 612, 275 P.2d 473 (1954). See also 2 HARPER & JAmEs, op. cit. supra note 1, at
1034; REsTATEmENT, ToRTs § 46 (Supp. 1948). But see Bosley v. Andrews, 184 Pa. Super. 396, 135 A.
2d 263, aff'd, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958), where the Pennsylvania court refused to repudiate
the impact theory despite fiery criticism from fellow judges in both the superior and supreme courts.
The fact that all the jurisdictions retaining the impact rule have urban areas in excess of one million
in population has led one authority to theorize that the rule has been retained as a preventive
against the false claims of ambulance chasers. McNiece, op. cit. supra note 15, at 15 n.40.
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mental anguish alone, e.g., fright, humiliation, indignation, it is insufficient to support
a cause of action for negligence.
17
B. Causal Connection
The requirement of causal connection is no less critical in "aggravation" cases
than it is in any other problem of tort liability. Included in the general rule is the
necessity of connecting the aggravation of the prior condition with the wrongful act
of the tort-feasor. Because of the tendency of the injured party to expand his damages
by alleging such aggravation, the courts are continually on guard to offset this propen-
sity with a rigid requirement of causal connection.' s The resolution of the issue becomes
obscure when the prior condition is active, rather than dormant, and the issue of ac-
celeration is presented.' 9 The mere exacerbation of a latent or subsiding condition
immediately following the accident is not proof of causal connection.
20
The medical expert is a sine qua non in these cases, and his opinion is often the
only evidence of causal connection since the subject matter is usually beyond the com-
prehension of court and jury.2 1 Also, since the plaintiff must prove his case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, he has the burden of proving causal connection. Academic-
ally, plaintiff would have to exceed the defendant's experts in number; however, as a
practical matter, courts tend to avoid a parade of expert witnesses and hold that lack
of numbers alone will not preclude recovery. 22
C. Measure of Damages
The measure of damages is probably the courts' most difficult problem in the
aggravation cases. The attempt is made to limit the damages to those which resulted
from the injury.23 Where the pre-existing condition was latent or dormant, causing no
pain or discomfort to the plaintiff prior to the injury, the task of the court is relatively
simple since the defendant is liable to the complete extent of the plaintiff's injury.2 4
However, if the accident merely accelerated the plaintiff's existing malady, the plaintiff's
damages are limited to the increase of ill effects resulting from the accident 25 or, phrased
differently, defendant's liability is limited to that injury over and above the consequences
which the pre-existing condition would have produced had there been no aggravation.20
However, if the permanent injury resulting from the accident would have resulted na-
17 Espinosa v. Beverley Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952). Cf. Smith, Relation
of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 228
n.128 (1944).
1 Anderson v. Kinloch, 252 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. App. 1952) (causal connections was "purely specula-
tive" where plaintiff suffered a heart attack three weeks after auto collision).
1.9 Walker v. Joseph P. Geddes Funeral Serv., Inc., 33 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 1948).
20 Land v. Colletti, 79 So. 2d 641 (La. App. 1955) (18 months); Anderson v. Kinloch, 252 S.W.
2d 24 (Ky. App. 1952) (3 weeks).
21 See, e.g., Payton v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 83 So. 2d 575 (La. App. 1955). Failure to use
expert testimony may create the inference of a weak case. 2 WiGMoRE, EvmENcE § 290 (3d ed. 1940).
See also Maroun v. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc., 83 So. 2d 397 (La. App. 1955); Anderson v.
Kinloch, supra note 20.
22 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2034 (3d ed. 1940). Also, a limitation may be set upon the number
of expert witnesses. 6 WIGMORE, supra § 1908. But see Walker v. Joseph P. Geddes Funeral Serv.,
Inc., 33 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 1948). In this case plaintiff's expert found causal connection, but de-
fendant's expert disagreed. The appellate court reversed a verdict for plaintiff on the ground that
plaintiff had not sustained his burden.
23 Cf. Bauer, Fundamental Principles of the Law of Damages in Medico-Legal Cases, 19 TENN.
L. RFv. 255, 261 (1946).
24 Garrett v. Taylor, 69 Idaho 487, 210 P.2d 386 (1949); Owen v. Dix, 210 Ark. 562, 196 S.W.2d
913 (1946). See also Note, 22 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 135, 139 (1947).
25 Sterrett v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 150 Tex. 12, 236 S.W.2d 776 (1951).
26 Nelson v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 239 Minn. 276, 58 N.W.2d 561 (1953). An interesting
case exemplifying the extension of damages is Jameson v. Bloomingdale Bros., 132 N.Y.S.2d 682
(Sup. Ct. 1954). In this case plaintiff injured her right leg in an accident. She later lost her left leg.
Although defendant was not liable for loss of the left leg, his damages for the original injury were
raised since the loss of the left leg plus the damaged right leg rendered plaintiff no longer ambulatory.
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turally from the pre-existing condition, the defendant nonetheless is liable if the injury
hastened the process. 27 The extent of these damages in dollars, a question which would
prove perplexing for the most scholarly of physicians, is for the jury to decide. 28 One
wonders at the wisdom of using the normal lay jury for this function.
The court is able to exercise some control over this determination with its instruc-
tions and its power to grant a new trial or apply remittitur. The numerous cases involv-
ing erroneous instructions on this issue are a persuasive indication that trial court
judges are either confused by the complexity of the issue or simply feel that a general
charge is sufficient.2 9 The difficulty of ascertaining the correct amount of damages has
given rise to numerous appeals, both as to the excessiveness and inadequacy of the
award.8 0 Such appeals have occasionally met with success. 31
D. Pleading
The method of pleading the "aggravation" issue has led to some unfortunate results.
As a rule, in the code-pleading jurisdictions, general damages, or those which are na-
turally presumed to follow from the alleged injuries, need not be alleged in the pleadings.
Those not presumed to follow are termed special damages and must be pleaded with
particularity so that the defendant will not be taken by surprise.3 2 Although there is
agreement that the aggravation of a pre-existing condition, e.g., arthritis, may flow
naturally from an injury alleged in the pleading, e.g., a back injury, some courts require
a special pleading of the existence of the condition prior to the accident, and its sub-
sequent aggravation as a result of the injury.33 These courts require that the damage
"necessarily" result from the alleged injury before it can be presumed, and an aggra-
vation of a pre-existing condition is not a "necessary" result.8 4 Other jurisdictions ad-
mit evidence "as to aggravation of a pre-existing condition even though there is no
allegation of such aggravation in the complaint." 35
Since the objective of the special pleading is to put the defendant on guard, some
other courts have been persuaded to strike a middle ground. If it can be seen from the
pleadings that the defendant had sufficient notice of the "aggravation" claim, the evi-
dence will be admitted notwithstanding a technical oversight in the pleadings. 36 This
approach seems consonant with the trend away from the obligatory fact pleading.3 7
27 Walker v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 362 Mo. 648, 243 S.W.2d 92 (1951). See also Allied Van
Lines, Inc. v. Parsons, 80 Ariz. 88, 293 P.2d 430 (1956).
28 Waterloo Say. Bank v. Waterloo, C.F. & N. R.R., 244 Iowa 1364, 60 N.W.2d 572 (1953).
29 Western Guar. Loan Co. v. Dean, 309 S.W.2d 857, 867 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). See also Cole-
man County Elec. Coop. v. Agnew, 265 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App.), afl'd, 153 Tex. 587, 272 S.W.2d
877 (1954); Nelson v. Twin-City Motor Bus Co., 239 Minn. 276, 58 N.W.2d 561 (1953); Louisville
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Hill, 304 Ky. 565, 201 S.W.2d 731 (1947).
30 See, e.g., Thompson v. Healzer Cartage Co., 287 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1956) (inadequate);
Knoblock v. Morris, 169 Kan. 540, 220 P.2d 171 (1950) (excessive).
31 Walker v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 362 Mo. 648, 243 S.W.2d 92 (1951) ($14,000 to $10,000);
Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951) ($27,500 to $5,000).
32 CLARK, CODa PLEADING 329 (2d ed. 1947).
33 Littman v. Bell Tel. Co. 315 Pa. 370, 172 Atl. 687 (1934); Salmi v. Columbia & N. R.R., 75
Ore. 200, 146 Pac. 819 (1915); Whitlock v. Mungiven, 35 R.I. 386, 90 Atl. 756 (1914); Hayes v.
City of St. Clair, 173 Mich. 631, 139 N.W. 1037 (1913); May v. Hexter, 226 S.W.2d 383, 388 (Mo.
App. 1950); Samuels v. New York Rys. Corp., 226 App. Div. 94, 234 N.Y. Supp. 377 (1929). See
also Wood v. Lit Bros., 173 Pa. Super. 4, 94 A.2d 69 (1953).
34 See May v. Hexter, supra note 33, at 388. But see Varley v. Motyl, 139 Conn. 128, 90 A.2d
869 (1952).
35 Johnson v. Howard, 45 Wash. 2d 433, 275 P.2d 736, 745 (1954). See also Virginia Ry. &
Power Co. v. Hubbard, 120 Va. 664, 91 S.E. 618 (1917); Conrad v. Shuford, 174 N.C. 719, 94 S.E.
424 (1917).
30 Varley v. Motyl, 139 Conn. 128, 90 A.2d 869 (1952); Leingang v. Geller, Ward & Hasner
Hardware Co., 335 Mo. 549, 73 S.W.2d 256, 260 (1934); Wadell v. Pub. Serv. Coordinated Transp.,
3 N.J. Super. 132, 65 A.2d 766 (1949).
37 The federal rules generally follow the code pleading states on this issue and require special
pleading. FED. R. Cxv. P. 9(g); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAMCeE 1921-24 (2d ed. 1948). Although
some liberality is indicated, it must be remembered that defendant has numerous discovery procedures
at his disposal under these rules.
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However, because of the uncertainty in this area, it might well behoove counsel to
plead specially the aggravation itself, or at least the pre-existing condition from which
the aggravation can be "necessarily" implied.38
II. LIABILITY FOR PHYsICIAN's MALPRACTICE
A. General Rule
Another circumstance in the general theme of this Note which necessitates a
separate discussion is that of a physician's act of malpractice which aggravates an injury
the victim has received from the original tort-feasor. Few rules are as well-settled as
the general rule regarding the extent of liability of the tort-feasor in this situation. If
the victim's injuries are aggravated by the negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of a
physician, the negligence of the wrongdoer in causing the original injury is also the
proximate cause of the subsequent damages.3 9 This rule is premised on the fact that the
possibility of negligent medical treatment is a risk incident to the victim's injury and is
therefore a foreseeable intervening cause.40 A recent decision in New York reflects the
seemingly limitless range of this rule. In Ferrara v. Galluchio,41 the court of appeals
charged the original tort-feasor with liability for the victim's cancerphobia (phobic
apprehension that cancer would ultimately develop) resulting from a doctor's statement
that the original injury might possibly become cancerous.
The principal defenses available against this rule present a curious analytical in-
consistency. If the victim selects the doctor, he must exercise ordinary care in the selec-
tion or be precluded from recovery. 42 If the defendant selects the doctor, and uses
ordinary care, he is not liable for the subsequent aggravation. 43 In the latter case, the
"vision" of the defendant is evidently clouded by his own gratuitous act so as to pre-
clude the court's use of the subtle "foreseeable" intervening cause rationale.
B. Release
Due to the presence of a third person (the doctor in this factual pattern) some
conceptual difficulties have arisen regarding the process of suit. One difficulty which
could prove to be a latent snare for the careless attorney is seen in the cases involving
38 Code pleading states are not as ably equipped with discovery mechanism, and, consequently,
more importance must be centered upon the pleadings for the purpose of giving adequate notice to
the defendant. Therefore, any liberalizing trend in pleading must be accompanied by pre-trial dis-
covery procedures.
39 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Hill, 237 U.S. 208 (1915). For numerous cases reiterating this rule, see
8 A.L.R. 506 (1920); 39 A.L.R. 1268 (1925); 126 A.L.R. 912 (1940). The early courts indicated
that defendant could give evidence of the doctor's malpractice in mitigation of his own damages.
Thorne v. California Stage Co., 6 Cal. (2 Pac. St. Rep.) 232 (1856) (dictum). This theory was not
followed.
40 Lucas v. City of Juneau, 127 F. Supp. 730 (D. Alaska 1955); PRossER, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 272; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 457, comment a (1934). It has been suggested that this rule extends
to any third person who negligently harms the injured person in the process of obtaining medical
treatment. Lucas v. City of Juneau, supra at 732 (ambulance driver); R.STATEMENT, supra § 457,
comments b & c. However, the original tort-feasor is not liable for the third person's intentional
harm or gross negligence. Corbett v. Clarke, 187 Va. 222, 46 S.E.2d 327 (1948); RESTATEMNT,
supra § 457, comment d.
41 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
42 See Stephenson v. Steinhaner, 188 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1951); Bessinger v. De Loach, 230 S.C.
1, 94 S.E.2d 3 (1956); Hicks Rubber Co. v. Harper, 131 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App.), appeal dis-
missed, 134 Tex. 89, 132 S.W.2d 579 (1939).
43 This rule is of ancient vintage, Secord v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 18 Fed. 221 (D. Minn. 1883),
and has obtained to the present day. See Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F.2d 973 (5th Cir.
1947); Gosnell v. Southern Ry., 202 N.C. 234, 162 S.E. 569 (1932), judgment vacated on other
grounds, 205 N.C. 297, 171 S.E. 52 (1933). But see Easler v. Columbia Ry., G. & E. Co., 100 S.C.
96, 84 S.E. 417 (1915) (parents of victim objected to defendant's choice of doctors). On the other
hand, if the defendant, usually an employer, employs the doctor for his own ends and purposes, e.g.,
for a pre-employment physical, the physician is his agent or servant and the defendant is liable
vicariously for the doctor's negligence. Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., supra at 975; Rannard
v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 149, 157 P.2d 1 (1945); Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit Inc.,
202 Misc. 527, 116 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1952).
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a release. The doctor in the usual aggravation situation is liable only to the extent of
the aggravation caused by his negligence. The original wrongdoer is liable for both
the original injury and the aggravation, assuming that the intervening cause was fore-
seeable. The policy of preventing double recovery has persuaded a majority of the
courts to hold that a release of the original tort-feasor is a bar to a subsequent action
against the physician for malpractice. 44 With a release of the tort-feasor who is liable
for the whole of the plaintiffs damage, the cause of action is discharged. A few courts
have taken a contrary position, holding that the release of itself does not preclude suit
against the physician.4 5 The intention of the parties controls and must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. This latter view seems the better, since it recognizes the
fear of the majority-the possibility of a double recovery-yet also prevents injustice
to the litigant who, because of an oversight, settled with the original tort-feasor. In any
event, the physician does not escape unscathed, since the original wrongdoer, when
required to pay the whole, is subrogated to any right of action the plaintiff had against
the negligent physician. 46 No difficulty is presented when the first suit is brought against
the doctor since he is liable only for the aggravation damages. 47
C. Release in Workmen's Compensation Cases
Some courts, imbued with the resolute purpose of prohibiting double recovery,
have carried the common law tort rationale into workmen's compensation cases. If the
employee accepts an award of full compensation from his employer, he is precluded
from suing the physician in tort for malpractice.48 At first glance this would seem
highly discriminatory to the employee, since the award for the aggravation under a
compensation statute is minimal in comparison to a recovery for malpractice. 49 This
difficulty is circumvented in most of the states through their respective subrogation
procedures.50 However, in some states the practitioner is exempted from liability for
his wrong in this situation since neither the employer nor the employee can bring a
subsequent action. 5 '
44 Milks v. McIver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934). For an exhaustive list of cases regarding
this subject, see generally, 40 A.L.R.2d 1075 (1955). Within this rule, however, some courts will
permit the subsequent action if the parties clearly indicated this intention at the time of the release.
Green v. Waters, 260 Wis. 40, 49 N.W.2d 919 (1951). If, however, the aggravation was not fore-
seeable, and a new and independent injury resulted from the physician's malpractice, the release
of the original tortfeasor is held not to be a bar. Corbett v. Clarke, 187 Va. 222, 46 S.E.2d .327
(1948).
45 Dickow v. Cookinham, 123 Cal. App. 2d 81, 266 P.2d 63 (1954). See also Wheat v. Carter,
79 N.H. 150, 106 Ati. 602 (1919).
46 Clark v. Halstead, 276 App. Div. 17, 93 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1949). An assiduous use of procedural
impleading by the original tort-feasor would circumvent the difficulty of two suits. See Clark v.
Halstead, supra at 51. However, the victim cannot make the doctor a party to a suit against the
original tort-feasor since the two are not joint tort-feasors. The malpractice of the physician is an
independent and unrelated cause of action even though the damages are congruous. Bost v. Metcalfe,
,19 N.C. 607, 14 S.E.2d 648 (1941).
47 Cf. Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros., 267 N.Y. 410, 196 N.E. 308 (1935). However, a subsequent
suit against the original tort-feasor can include only the damages prior to the aggravation. It would
seem that this is the most advantageous procedure for the plaintiff since the aggregate of two jury
verdicts may result in a larger award.
48 Cf. Comment, 25 IND. LJ. 218 (1949).
49 Makarenko v. Scott, 132 W. Va. 430, 55 S.E.2d 88 (1949); Parchefsky v. Kroull Bros., 267 N.Y.
410, 196 N.E. 308 (1935). For an exhaustive list of cases on this subject, see 2 LARSON, WoRKMEa's
COMPENSATION § 72.61 (1952).
50 Garrison v. Graybeel, 308 S.W.2d 375 (Tenn. 1957); Seaton v. United States Rubber Co.,
223, Ind. 404, 61 N.E.2d 177 (1945); Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros., supra note 49, at 312. Once the
employee accepts the award, his right of action turns on the specific subrogation procedure. In the
majority of states, the acceptance does not work a bar. Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8(1952); Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 65 S.E.2d 575 (1951); Schumacher v. Leslie, 360 Mo. 1238,
232 S.W.2d 913 (1950). In any event no matter which party sues, the ultimate results are the same.
Following a successful suit against the physician, the employer is reimbursed for the compensation
paid for the "aggravation" part of the prior award, with the excess going to the employee. See 2
LARSON, op. cit. supra note 49, at § 74.
51 Makarenko v. Scott, 132 W. Va. 430, 55 S.E.2d 88 (1949); Paine v. Wyatt, 217 Iowa 1147, 251
N.W. 78 (1933); Ross v. Erickson Const. Co., 89 Wash. 634, 155 Pac. 153 (1916). The Georgia
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The jurisdictions recognizing the prior award as a bar to a subsequent suit by the
employee seem to have fallen victim to a common error in compensation theory. The
compensation acts were designed to recompense the employee for wrongs which previ-
ously were without remedy at common law due to circumstances surrounding his em-
ployment, e.g., the employer-employee relationship. Whenever the injury has no con-
nection with one's employment, the historical basis for compensation has been re-
moved. 52 In the "aggravating-physician" situation, the injury for compensation purposes
is the original injury, although the employer is liable for the subsequent aggravation by
way of supplementary damages. 53 Yet the negligent act of the physician also gives rise
to an unrelated cause of action in tort, and under the general rule, the physician is
liable for the "aggravation" damages. 54 However, the mere fact that recovery from
court seemed formerly committed to this rule in McConnell v. Hames, 45 Ga. App. 307, 164 S.E.
476 (1932); however, the case was criticized in Gay v. Greene, 91 Ga. App. 78, 84 S.E.2d 847
(1954) and the court declined to follow its rule. The New Jersey courts are in a similar dilemma
since Burns v. Vilardo, 26 N.J. Misc. 277, 60 A.2d 94 (1948) exempted the practitioner while
Dettman v. Goldsmith, 11 N.J. Super. 571, 78 A.2d 626 (1951) held the employee could sue notwith-
standing a prior compensation award. See also Shortridge v. Bede, 51 Wash. 2d 391, 319 P.2d 277(1957) where, although the Washington court reserved opinion on the issue, it seemed receptive to
argument for change.
52 Cf. Schumacher v. Leslie, 360 Mo. 1238, 232 S.W.2d 913 (1950); McGough v. McCarthy
Improvement Co., 206 Minn. 1, 287 N.W. 857 (1939). See also 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 49,§ 2.10.
53 A few jurisdictions have construed the statute to mean that the employer need not compensate
the employee for the "aggravation" injuries. Duncan v. W.M. Davidson Const. Co., 170 Kan. 520,
227 P.2d 95 (1951); Humber Towing Co. v. Barclay, 5 B.W.C.C. 142 (1911). However, the vast
majority include such damages. 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 49, at 188.
54 Garrison v. Graybeel, 308 S.W.2d 375 (Tenn. 1957). The act itself is a tort and is not within
the purview of the compensation act. All the states, with the exception of Ohio and West Virginia,
have enacted specific "third person" provisions by which the employee's common law action is
preserved against a tort-feasor who is not within the employer-employee status. Cf. 2 LARsoN, op. cit.
supra note 49, at § 71. This "third person" may include a co-employee in most states, Garrison v.
Graybeel, supra at 379, although others extend immunity to co-employees and those in "common
employment." 2 LARSON, supra at § 72.20-.30. This distinction becomes vital under the instant cir-
cumstance since the physician is often an agent or employee of the employer, and if included within
the act, is immune from suit at law. See, e.g., Martin v. Consolidated Cas. Co., 138 F.2d 896 (5th
Cir. 1943); Hayes v. Marshall Field & Co., 351 Ill. App. 329, 115 N.E.2d 99 (1953).
Formerly in two other states, Alabama and Illinois, and possibly a third, Washington, if the
doctor carried compensation insurance for his employees, he was immune against suit at tort for
malpractice while treating a compensable injury of any employee in the state. See, e.g., Duvardo v.
Moore, 343 Il. App. 304, 98 N.E.2d 855 (1951); 2 LARSoN, op. cit. supra note 49, at § 72.40. Larson
favors this extension of immunity to all the members of the state's compensation system. He feels
that since "the purpose of the legislation was to dispense with common law personal injury litigation
for the benefit of members of the system, all members should benefit alike .. " Professor Larson
envisions an extension of the immunity even beyond the particular state's boundaries.
However, this extension of the system seems inconsistent with the traditional objectives of
the early compensation acts. It gives protection to employers outside the immediate employer-employee
relationship from which the original acts developed, and precludes suits at common law which would
not have been barred by the defenses accompanying that status. CI. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 49,
§ 4. The Duvardo result was upset in Illinois by Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106
N.E.2d 124 (1952) where the applicable provision of the act was declared unconstitutional. The
Alabama statute, ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 26 § 311 (1941), was subsequently repealed. Ala. Acts 1947,
§ 2, at 485. The Washington statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.010 (1939), was re-enacted without
the unusual immunity provision. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.010 (1957). Thus, the statutory support
for a trend in favor of Professor Larson's theory has faded. It is submitted that the practical and
historical difficulties confronting this theory will prove to be insurmountable notwithstanding its
idealistic worth.
The furthest extension of the "third person" provision is seen in Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal.
2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952). Here the employer was also a chiropractor and he sought to render aid
after the industrial injury occurred, but succeeded only in aggravating the injury. The court held
that the fact that the attending doctor is the employer does not affect the legal rights of the
employee. The merit of this decision is that the court correctly adhered to the distinction between
both acts of injury and recognized that the act of aggravation, although performed by the employer,
was not executed by him as an employer within the relationship contemplated by the compensation
act.
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both actions overlap is not sufficient justification for using the compensation theory as
a preventive to a perfectly valid action in tort. The intermingling of the systems may
harm the very person the compensation statutes are designed to protect.55
The jurisdictions providing employer subrogation are said to give the employee his
due since he gets the excess of any recovery by the employer. However, this is little
solace if the employer either refuses to sue or does so carelessly, with no real determina-
tion to obtain as large a recovery as he can. The employee was the person injured; he
should be given the command of his own suit. Reason requires the conclusion that the
two injuries be confined to their respective systems. A considerable amount of authority
supports this conclusion.50 Common sense suggests that the compensation statutes ought
not be used to counteract the policy on which they stand, i.e., the protection and ad-
vancement of employee claims. Little, if anything, need be said of the jurisdictions
which discharge the negligent physician of liability.57 The inequitable results in these
cases give sufficient indication of the reasoning supporting the decisions.
III. THE ALLERGY CASES
A. The General Rule
When one begins a discussion of an aspect or area of the law using as his theme
the "growth of the law," he is necessarily crystallizing one or more "general rules" in
the area in order to have them conform with "change," either physical, as in the case
of the discovery of unknown chemical elements, or psychical, as the recognition of the
right of a particular minority. The "general rule" can be expanded, contracted, or even
abrogated, whenever existing values are reformulated to recognize an action for anti-
quated remediless harms, or novel harms recently recognized. In the last few years it
has become evident that an appreciable percentage of the populace has been harmed
by hypersensitive reactions to ingredients contained within the growing number of
products on the market composed mainly of chemical elements. Such products usually
contain an allergenic ingredient which, though harmless to the public in general, ad-
versely affects the allergic user.58
The typical action for this injury is generally pleaded on alternate grounds: breach
of warranty either express or implied, and negligence. 59 The parties defendant usually
include both the seller and the manufacturer, since each may be liable under one or
both theories. The preferred theory is that of breach of warranty, since the problem of
proof is less demanding60 and this remedy approaches the imposition of an absolute
liability on the vendor. 61 However, the difficulties arising from the use of this theory
55 See Leidy, Malpractice Actions and Compensation Acts, 29 MIcH. L. RaV. 568 (1931).
56 See notes 50 & 52, supra.
57 See 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 49, at 191.
58 Allergy is defined as "the abnormal reaction of tissues to physical stimuli." FEINBERG, ALLERGY
IN PRACnCE 49 (1944). The type of allergy usually involved in these cases may be termed the
"contact" type. This type is "manifested mainly by reaction in the upper layers of the skin, occasioned
usually through direct contact with the antigen. The reaction produced is a contact dermatitis arising
from the direct contact of the allergen with the skin surface." FEINBERG, supra at 54. An antigen is a
"substance capable of stimulating the production of a specific anti-body.... Allergens are substances
which produce responses of hypersensitiveness, regardless whether they do or do not result in demon-
strable antibodies. [The term] "allergen" is also employed to signify the source of the allergenic
substance." FEINBERG, supra at 65. See also Horowitz, Allergy of the Plaintiff as a Defense in Actions
Based Upon Breach of Implied Warranty of Quality, 24 So. CAL. L. Rav. 221, 224-27 (1951).
59 See, e.g., Cumberland v. Household Research Corp. of America, 145 F. Supp. 782 (D. Mass.
1956).
60 For instance, in some jurisdictions the seller's knowledge of the defect may be material in a
negligence action, but he is liable notwithstanding knowledge in a warranty action if the other
requisites are met. See Zampino v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 10 Misc. 2d 686, 173 N.Y.S.2d 117, 120
(Sup. Ct. 1958). Also, in a few jurisdictions, contributory negligence is not a defense against a suit
for breach of warranty. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939);
Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933).
61 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 28.15, 28.26 (1956).
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in the allergy situation-e.g., lack of privity of contract, 2 the so-called "abnormality"
of the vendee, 63 and the other usual defenses against an action on warranty64 -have
generally precluded the plaintiff from recovery, although a few courts have indicated
their receptiveness to recognize a remedy under this theory notwithstanding the de-
fenses.6 5 The basic principles involved in recovery under warranty follow closely that
of negligence, 66 and to prevent an overlapping in the treatment of both, the remainder
of this Note will focus on the negligence theory, with the understanding that the ar-
62 Breach of warranty is usually pleaded against the seller since under ordinary circumstances the
buyer has no privity of contract with the manufacturer. Barasch, Allergies and the Law, 10 BROOKLYN
L. R V. 363, 368 (1941). The general rule requires privity of contract between the parties for a
recovery on express or implied warranty with the exception of sales of foodstuffs and medicines.
I WILLIsToN, SALES § 244 (rev. ed. 1948).
63 The favorite defense against both expressed and implied warranties is that the injury was
caused by the abnormal physical condition of the user. It is said that "warranties do not extend to
injuries caused by the peculiar idiosyncrasies or physical condition of the user which are not reason-
ably foreseeable." Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 1956). See also
Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955); Comment, 25 FORDHAM L. REV.
306 (1956). For a list of cases supporting this proposition, see 26 A.L.R.2d 963 (1952).
64 Some of these are the following:
1. Failure to prove warranty: Few sellers expressly include the deleterious effects of an
allergy in the warranty. The language used is that the product is "harmless" or "will not injure the
skin." See Cumberland v. Household Research Corp. of America, 145 F. Supp. 782, 785 (D. Mass.
1956). However, this language may also constitute the implied warranties of fitness or merchantability
although the latter attaches automatically from the sale of the particular product itself. Zampino v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 10 Misc. 2d 686, 173 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Sup. Ct. 1958); UNWoRM SALES ACT
15(1), (2), (5). See also Horowitz, op. cit. supra note 58, at 222.
2. Contributory negligence: Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955).
Contributory negligence is a good defense against breach of warranty under the majority rule.
3. Disclaimer: see Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L.
REv. 117, 157-67 (1943).
65 Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697 (1939); Zirpola v. Adams
Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73 (1939). As for the privity of contract preventive, numerous
writers have advocated an extension of the "food and medicine" exceptions, especially in regard to
packaged articles sold by the manufacturer to the general public through dealers. See 2 HARPER &
JAMEs, ToRTs 1573 (1956); 1958 ILL. LAW FoRUM 314. The tendency of courts to recognize express
warranties in the extensive advertising accompanying the product may remove this limitation in suits
against the manufacturer. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612
(1958); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952). See 1
WLnisToN, supra at 648. It has also been suggested that cosmetics, which incidentally form the bulk
of the "allergy" cases, and other preparations sold in sealed packages and designed for application
to the body be included in the "foodstuffs and medicine" exception to the privity rule. Rogers v.
Toni Home Permanent Co., supra at 614; Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., supra at 535. Also,
application of the rule to implied warranties has recently received some adverse criticism because of
the similarity between implied warranty and negligence. See Spence v. Three Rivers Builders &
Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
In regard to the defense of abnormality of the vendee (see note 64 supra and accompanying
text), some courts have recognized the necessity of protecting the allergic segment of the public and
allow recovery despite the allergy if the plaintiff can show he is one of a class of "some" people.
Cumberland v. Household Research Corp. of America, 145 F. Supp. 782, 785 (D. Mass. 1956);
Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., supra at 699. It has been suggested that the confusion lies in the
failure of the courts to understand allergy and to recognize the allergic plaintiff as a member of a
class to be protected. See Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 899 (10th Cir. 1956) (con-
curring opinion); Horovitz, op. cit. supra note 58, at 223.
The semantic difficulty in the treatment of warranty in the allergy cases is seen in Jacquot
v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., 149 N.E.2d 635, 639 (Mass. 1958). The Massachusetts court insists that
the plaintiff prove "that the product was unfit to be used by a normal person" to recover under
warranty. (Emphasis added.) However, in the same breath the court approved the holding in
Bianchi, i.e., that although the allergen would not affect the "average person," as long as the plain-
tiff could prove he was a member of a class of "some" persons allergic to the product, there will be a
recovery. Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., supra at 699. In Jacquot, the court denied recovery
because the plaintiff did not show she was one of a class of persons described in Bianchi. Therefore,
it must be concluded that the Massachusetts court has held that a person who is a member of a
class of persons sensitive to a product which is harmless to the average person is "normal."
66 See Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 1956).
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guments in favor of recovery under negligence may also be used in presenting a case
under the warranty theory.
A preliminary statement must first be made before entering a discussion of the
negligence theory. The allergy cases do not present the usual "inherently dangerous
product" problem that generated the MacPherson rule. 67 The usual cases under this
rule stem from the negligent manufacture of the product. The allergy cases, on the
other hand, are concerned not with an article negligently made but with an article in-
herently dangerous to a limited segment of the general public, i.e., those allergic to an
ingredient in the article. Negligence arises from the failure of the manufacturer to warn
this segment. The manufacturer is understandably reluctant to include this warning be-
cause of its pernicious effect on the product's marketability.
The duty of a manufacturer to warn the remote vendee of an inherently dangerous
product was recognized in this country more than one hundred years ago. 68 However,
the necessity of warning a minute segment of the ultimate users - those allergic to an
ingredient within the product - is of recent vintage. The product is absolutely harmless
to the vast majority of people, but may result in injury and even death to a few. The
earliest thought on the matter was that the duty applied only when the manufacturer or
seller had actual knowledge of the danger. 69 A later development, strengthening this
rule in favor of the manufacturer, or seller, was expressed in Bish v. Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp.70 This court stated that a warning was not required where an "injury re-
sults from the sensitivity or allergy of a person in the use of a product which would be
innocuous to normal people."'71 A few days later in Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp.,7 2
the Tenth Circuit held there was no duty to warn even though the manufacturer knew
that "some unknown few, not in an identifiable class which could be effectively warned"
may suffer allergic reactions or other isolated injuries not common to the ordinary or
normal person.
A close reading of these cases reflects three salient considerations. The first is
that these courts appear apprehensive of extending the manufacturer's duty beyond
the "normal" or "average" person, intimating that a person with an allergy is not, for
this purpose, normal.73 Secondly, for the most part they seem unable to recognize the
"allergic person" as a member of a distinctive class of sufficient size to warrant pro-
67 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See also Dillard & Hart,
Product Liability: Directions for Use and Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. _Rv. 145, 146 (1955).
68 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. (2 Seld.) 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1857).
69 Briggs v. National Industries, Inc., 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d-110 (1949). This case re-
ferred to the dangerous character of the product. In Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45,
143 N.W. 48 (1913), the court found knowledge .that the commodity would injure "some" innocent
purchaser. See also Arnold v. May Dep't Stores Co., 337 Mo. 727, 85 S.W.2d 748 (1935), where
a beautician applied hair dye to plaintiff even though the plaintiff had warned her of a "sensitive"
skin. This court indicated it was receptive to the theory of negligence without actual knowledge of
the danger to a particular person. See note 76 infra.
70 236 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1956). This court supported its statement with a case from New South
Wales. Levi v. Colgate-Palmolive Proprietary, Ltd., 41 N.S.W. St. 48, 58 Weekly N. 63 (1941). See
also Zampino v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 10 Misc. 2d 686, 173 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (dictum).
71 236 F.2d at 69.
72 235 F.2d 893, 897 (1956). This court relied on a quotation from Bennett v. Pilot Prod. Co.,
120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951) where the court criticized former cases for permitting recovery
to an "unanticipated few whose sensitivities or allergies are not reasonably foreseeable...." How-
ever, the cases it criticized, Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913) and
Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc., 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939), found that the
product affected more than a few-certairt to injure "some" in Gerkin, and "4 or 5% of all persons"
in Zirpola - which reasonably could have excluded them from the "unanticipated" class.
73 See Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., supra note 72, at 897; Bish v. Employers Liab. Assur.
Corp., supra note 70, at 69; Bennett v. Pilot Prod. Co., supra note 72, at 527. See also PRossER,
TORTS 503 (2d ed. 1955). This consideration seems analogous to the requisite for liability in an
action for breach of the warranty of merchantability. See Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.,
241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); Habrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d
392 (1955). But see the discussion of Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., 149 N.E.2d 635 (Mass.
1958) in note 65 supra.
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tection.74 Thirdly, and as a necessary conclusion to the above premises, the courts fail
to see the foreseeability of a reasonable man which would lodge negligence in the
manufacturer for failing to warn under these circumstances. 75
B. The Plea for Change
The soundness of the accepted allergy theories was questioned in the concurring
opinion of Judge Murrah in the Merrill case. He noted that some jurisdictions, 76 notably
Massachusetts,77 have recognized a duty to warn of "known or imputed dangers" if
the allergic plaintiff could be placed in a class of "some" persons who would be injur-
iously affected by an ingredient in the product.78 He then drew upon scientific and
medical data to prove that the allergic and hypersensitive are recognized as a definite
class, presenting "physiological and biochemical problems arising out of . . . contact
with the products of advanced chemistry. ' 70 Judge Murrah concluded by fixing a duty
to warn in the manufacturer if it knew or should have known that some of the prod-
uct's ingredients were harmful to the "unusually susceptive."80
Subsequent cases appear to have followed the reasoning of Murrah rather than the
majority of the court in Merrill. In Wright v. Carter Products, Inc.,8 1 the Second
Circuit, although committed to Massachusetts law on the tort issue, held that the
manufacturer's standard of care "to its ultimate consumers may include a duty to warn
those few persons who [sic) it knows cannot apply its product without serious injury."82
A further extension of this duty is seen in Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co.,8 3 where the
manufacturer was held liable when an ingredient in its hair dye, paraphenylenediamine,
caused an allergic reaction in plaintiff which afflicted her with periarteritis nodosa,
a rare and usually fatal disease. The manufacturer had a patch test to determine
allergy which was used correctly by the plaintiff on the first application of the hair
dye with no adverse results. However, following numerous applications of the dye, the
plaintiff's skin became sensitized and she developed the reaction. It was shown that the
defendant gave no warning regarding the danger of subsequent applications. The fact
that the defendant knew nothing of the danger, and that this was the first case of record
of periarteritis nodosa in 75 million applications of defendant's product and untold
74 Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., supra note 72, at 897; Bish v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., supra
note 70, at 69; Bennett v. Pilot Prod. Co., supra note 72, at 527.
75 Ibid. The Merrill case indicates the error in the rationale of former opinions in using lack of
proximate cause as a basis for denying recovery. See Walstrom Optical Co. v. Miller, 59 S.W.2d 895
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Hamilton v. Harris, 204 S.W. 450 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). These courts
confused negligence with causation and held that allergy breaks the chain of causation as a matter
of law. Yet if we presume negligence in the defendant, as we must if we are to discuss proximate
cause, it is for failure to warn against these specific injuries. Consequently, the allergy cases stand
or fall on the negligence issue. Cf. Note, 49 MIcH. L. REv. 253 (1950).
78 Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, 122 N.J.L. 21, 4 A.2d 73 (1939); Arnold v. May Dep't Stores
Co., 337 Mo. 727, 85 S.W.2d 748 (1935); Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W.
48 (1913).
77 Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co., 302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697 (1939) (warranty). This
holding, although not overruled, appears somewhat tenuous in view of subsequent decisions on the
issue of warranty of fitness in Massachusetts. Cf. Graham v. Jordan Marsh Co., 319 Mass. 690, 67
N.E.2d 404 (1946). These cases emphasize the requirement of normalcy in the plaintiff. A possible
distinction is suggested in Wright v. Carter Prod. Co., 244 F.2d 53, 58 n.2 (2d Cir. 1957). In Graham,
the dealer was sued; in Bianchi, it was the manufacturer. The scope of the dealer's duty to warn is
said to include only the normal people. The manufacturer, however, is said to be an expert and
should foresee harm to the unusually susceptive. But see Comment, 25 FOtHAM L. Rev. 306, 312
(1956), which concluded that Graham overruled Bianchi. This conclusion, although justifiable at the
time the article was written, appears to have been incorrect in the light of Jacquot v. Win. Filene's
Sons Co., 149 N.E.2d 635, 639 (Mass. 1958).
78 Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 899 (10th Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion).
79 Ibid.
80 Id. at 900.
81 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957).
82 Id. at 58. Note the favorable quote to Murrah's opinion on p. 58 n.3.
83 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958). See also Schilling v. Roux Distrib. Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d
907 (1953).
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millions of other companies, were to no avail.8 4 There was some existing scientific in-
formation that the ingredient was a "sensitizer," and this was sufficient to raise the
duty to warn in the defendant.8 5
These cases appear to disagree with the rationale elicited in the Merrill line of
cases. Although they seem to agree that the allergic person is not normal, they part
company on the second premise and find that the law ought to extend its protection to
the hypersensitive. He is not an "isolated" or "unanticipated" user, but a member of
a distinctive class. The conclusion of foreseeability in the manufacturer follows a
fortiori.
The courts sanctioning the Merrill approach seem to consider it unfair to charge
the manufacturer with the duty of recognizing the danger to so small a segment of his
ultimate consumers. Yet, there is little to say in favor of this view. The manufacturer
is not asked to be an insurer of his product against any or all harms; he is merely
required to discover the nature of his product in the light of the available scientific
information. He is said to be an expert in his particular product and his standard
of care must be measured correspondingly.86 The expense of maintaining an adequate
staff, well-schooled in ferreting out the latent dangers of the product's ingredients, seems
minimal in comparison with the safety of the unsuspecting hypersensitive.
It has been asserted in defense of the maker that a warning is usually ineffectual
since the ultimate user is generally unaware of his allergic condition or, even if he were
aware of it, he would not have foreseen the particular consequences and used the
product anyway.87 In other words, the ignorance of the victim is used to discharge the
obligation to warn. The transparency of this assertion is apparent on its face for-two
reasons. First, it is assumed that every vendee ignorant of his allergy will ignore the
warning. The vendee is thereby given no opportunity to choose between accepting or
rejecting the risk of an allergic reaction. Secondly, this argument is contrary to public
policy. It tends to promote the refusal to warn even when the manufacturer knows of
the harmful ingredient on the belief that he may have an available defense against one
subsequently harmed who is ignorant of the allergy.
Once the duty to warn is recognized, the general principles of tort liability can be
applied. The warning must be sufficiently adequate to afford the user the opportunity of
avoiding all dangers from the product.8 8 If instructions accompany the product and are
found wanting or ambiguous, the maker may be liable for subsequent injuries.8 9 Failure
of the user to follow the instructions or conform to the warning constitutes contributory
negligence and precludes recovery.9 0
One element of the duty to warn remains to be discussed. Emphasis is usually
placed on the requirement that the allergic victim be included within a distinctive class.
Some would maintain this to be impossible, that the victims are isolated and their in-
juries are simply damnum absque injuria. 91 The better view recognizes the common plight
84 It was estimated that approximately 65 million applications per year were manufactured by
another company. See Phillips v. Roux Lab., 286 App. Div. 549, 145 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1955).
85 Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., supra note 83, at 763.
86 Ibid.
87 The majority in Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp. 235 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1956) seemed
particularly concerned with this aspect. Even Murrah in his concurring opinion appears to stress the
importance of the plaintiffs knowledge of her unusual susceptibility before the duty to warn is
brought into play. (Cf. the second question Murrah would have submitted to the jury had he been
able to use his theory. 235 F.2d at 900.) Directly opposed in its outlook was the court in Braun v.
Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958), where the consideration was obviously present due
to the rarity of the disease, and the court thought enough of it to exclude it entirely from the
opinion. Cf. Dillard & Hart, op. cit. supra note 67, at 163.
88 See Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., supra note 87. See also Dillard & Hart, op. cit. supra note
67, at 160, for an excellent analysis of the scope of the warning.
80 Schllling v. Roux Distrib. Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d (1953).
90 Arata v. Tonegato, 152 Cal. App. 2d 837, 314 P.2d 130 (1957).
91 Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (1956) and cases cited therein.
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of the hypersensitives and gives them the status of a "class."' 92 Yet in their phraseology,
these courts allude to a quantitative requirement of the class, that the victim be of a
class of "some" people, 93 a recognized "few."'94 The question arises whether this
quantitative requirement is satisfied by the fact of being allergic to the ingredient or
whether it additionally demands that the allergy be among the various recognized al-
lergies in existence. Since the vast majority of cases involve injuries from familiar
forms of dermatitis, the question may be academic. However, it is within the realm of
reason to have an allergy so rare as to effect but one, or at the very most, a meager
few of the users. 95 In this case, the distinction might be dispositive of the issue of
negligence. The better view, that which seems more consonant with the reasoning sup-
porting the general duty to warn, is that the quantitative requirement is satisfied by
proof of the victim's hypersensitivity without the necessity of proving other cases of
like instances of allergic reactions.96
Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that blind adherence to a "general
rule" in any case may lead to disaster. The usual aggravation cases have shown little,
if any, substantive changes over the last half-century. Yet on numerous occasions a
strong case for plaintiff is unsuccessful due to the attorney's failure to recognize and
avoid one of the many danger areas in the process of litigation. Perhaps a check-list of
the various troublesome areas may circumvent this result.
Of special concern to every personal injury attorney is the peculiar rule absolving
the original tort-feasor from damages due to subsequent malpractice by a doctor if the
tort-feasor has prudently selected the doctor. This selection must be made by the victim
or he may be precluded from holding the original wrongdoer liable for the "aggrava-
tion" damages and run the risk of the physician being insolvent, leaving him remediless
for these subsequent damages. An injudicious release of the original wrongdoer may
also result in a denial of recovery for the malpractice damages in most jurisdictions.
Three observations seem patent from the textual discussion of this problem: 1) an
attorney should be extremely hesitant about advising the victim to release the original
tort-feasor soon after the injury has occurred; 2) if a release is given and the "aggra-
vation" damages are known, the consideration for the release should include the "ag-
gravation" damages; 3) if there is no indication of "malpractice" damages at the time
of the release, the instrument nevertheless should be worded so as to express clearly
an intent to preserve a cause of action against the physician when and if any injuries
result from his malpractice.
The allergy cases present the difficult problem of reconciling a small minority's
right of protection against harm with a just consideration of the rights of the manu-
facturer or dealer, while at the same time recognizing the legitimate consumer interests
of the majority of purchasers. The issue confronting the courts may be phrased as
follows: is the impostion of a duty to warn the hypersensitive, or is the extension of the
scope of the warranty of merchantability to include his "abnormality," so burdensome
that it becomes unjust under the circumstances? An omnipresent consideration in the
92 Id. at 899 (concurring opinion).
93 Merrill v. Beaute Vues, Corp., 235 F.2d 893, 899 (10th Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion);
Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913).
94 Wright v. Carter Prod., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957).
95 See, e.g., Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958); Merrill v. Beaute Vues
Corp., 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956).
96 See Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., supra note 95. However, this analysis must be limited to
actions on negligence. The emphasis on normalcy in warranty actions would preclude recovery to
those afflicted with rare allergies. See Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114,
253 S.W.2d 532 (1952). Even in the jurisdictions which seem to favor extending the warranty to a
class of "some" persons sensitive to the product, the requirement "some" means more than the
fact of being allergic. See Jacquot v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., 149 N.E.2d 635 (Mass. 1958).
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resolution of this issue is the fact that any expense on the manufacturer, either by way
of liability in damages or increased insurance premiums, will ultimately be passed on
to the consumer in the form of an increase in price.
The duty to warn is not unduly burdensome, for the manufacturer is merely re-
quired to give the allergic an opportunity to avoid the harmful effects of his malady.
Once it is understood that the failure-to-warn action is to serve a preventive as well as a
compensatory purpose, four well-defined values emerge: 1) it prevents the manufacturer
from using the general public as a testing ground for potentially harmful products;
2) since the duty extends only to those elements in the products which the manufacturer
knew or should have known were likely to sensitize, the duty will result in preventive
measures of social and ecomonic value, such as product research; 3) the manufacturer
will be induced to rid his product of any allergenic ingredient; 4) the manufacturer's
response to the rule may promote an awareness of allergies and their symptoms, so that
allergic persons may avoid injury by simply avoiding the product. With these considera-
tions in mind, accompanied by the fact that the manufacturer can avoid liability by in-
serting an adequate warning, the imposition of this duty does not seem to be unjust in
the light of the protection it giVes the hypersensitive person. It is merely part of the
consideration the allergic receives for the purchase price of the product.
The extension of the scope of the implied warranty presents a more difficult
problem. While the duty to warn, as reflected in the Braun case, supra, approaches
strict liability, the warranty in fact requires mere proof of damage from the product
for recovery. Also, the dealer is usually the defendant in these actions, rather than the
manufacturer, although the dealer may have an action against the manufacturer fol-
lowing an unsuccessful defense. There is little that the dealer or maker can do to
escape liability. However, it is submitted that the beneficial aspects of the inclusion of
the hypersensitive within the warranty outweigh the burden it places on manufacturers
of sensitizing products. The inclusion would be a persuasive instrument in producing
the results mentioned above relative to the duty to warn. It would also serve as an
effective safeguard against the harmful effects stemming from the frequent use of
products containing newly-discovered chemical ingredients.
One limitation must be inserted, however. It would seem that even the most liberal
concept of warranty would exclude the hypersensitive with a rare allergy. That is, even
the jurisdictions including within the warranty those persons sensitive to a product
which is harmless to the "average person" would require that the allergic person be a
member of a class of "some" number of persons similarly situated, Although the num-
ber of people or percentage of the general populace comprising the term "some" has
never been definitively enunciated in any jurisdiction, it is clear that the number is
certainly more than one or a few. This limitation seems reasonable at the present time
since the basic concept of warranty does not require the vendor to insure every vendee
against every harm resulting from the product. On the other hand, to preclude recovery
on the ground that the sensitivity of the vendee renders him abnormal is to overlook the
fact that the class of hypersensitives has grown to a size of sufficient number to require
protection.
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